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From	workers	to	capitalists	in	less	than	two
generations:	the	Chinese	urban	elite
The	transformation	of	China	from	a	poor	and	egalitarian	country	to	an	upper	middle-income	country	with	the	level	of
income	inequality	greater	than	in	the	United	States	has	been	the	subject	of	innumerable	publications.	The	Chinese
transformation	is	a	unique	event	in	world	economic	history:	never	have	so	many	people	over	such	a	relatively	short
period	of	time	increased	their	income	so	much.	China’s	GDP	per	capita	in	1978,	at	the	time	of	the	initiation	of	rural
reforms,	was	about	$1,500;	by	2015,	it	was	more	than	$12,000	(both	in	constant	PPP	dollars,	data	from	the	2018
update	of	the	Maddison	Project	Database.).	For	comparison,	UK	GDP	per	capita	was	(expressed	in	the	same	units)
around	$12,000	in	1953,	while	its	GDP	per	capita	at	the	beginning	of	the	Industrial	Revolution	is	estimated	at	more
than	$3,000.	Thus,	it	took	the	UK	about	a	century-and-half	to	increase	its	GDP	per	capita	by	half	as	much	as	China
did	in	less	than	40	years	(see	Figure	1).
Figure	1.	GDP	per	capita	in	the	UK,	US,	and	China	(2015	PPP	dollars)
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Such	transformation	is	only	superficially	captured	by	synthetic	indicators	like	GDP	per	capita,	Gini	coefficient	or	the
share	of	the	top	one	per	cent	(Kanbur	and	Zhang,	2018;	Zhuang	and	Shi	2016;	Ding	and	He,	2018;	Wu	and	Perloff
2008;	Yang,	Piketty	and	Zucman	2018).	The	experienced	social	changes	were	much	deeper	(changement	en
profondeur)	and	affected	all	social	classes.	The	composition	and	characteristics	of	the	elite,	a	topic	with	which	we
are	concerned,	were	almost	completely	overhauled.
Our	objective	is	to	describe	and	analyse	the	change	in	the	Chinese	economic	elite	between	(approximately)	the
years	of	early	reforms	and	the	attainment	by	China	of	the	status	of	largest	economy	in	the	world	(in	PPP	terms).	We
are	interested	in	how	the	composition	and	characteristics	of	the	top	income	group	in	the	urban	area	have	changed
during	that	period.	Our	analysis	relies	on	the	nationally	representative	household	income	surveys	–	China
Household	Income	Project	(CHIP)	–	which	were	drawn	from	a	much	larger	sample	of	Urban	Household	Survey
(UHS)	conducted	annually	by	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS).	We	use	urban	samples	of	four	CHIP	waves
in	1988,	1995,	2002,	and	2013.	The	surveys	are	fundamentally	comparable	although	each	of	them	does	display
certain	idiosyncrasies	that	we	have	to	“iron	out”	in	order	to	make	the	variables	of	interest	fully	harmonised.		The
richness	of	the	survey	information	in	CHIP	allows	us	to	analyse	various	features	of	the	urban	elite	(defined	as	the
urban	top	five	per	cent	income	group),	and	the	evolution	of	these	characteristics	over	time	and	across	regions.	The
characteristics	which	we	shall	discuss	here	are	three:	share	of	total	urban	income	received	by	the	elite,	elite’s	social
composition,	and	CCP	(Chinese	Communist	Party)	membership.
Inequality
The	income	shares	of	the	three	top	groups	increased	between	1988	and	2013	(Figure	2).	The	top	one	per	cent
share	went	up	from	4.3	per	cent	in	1988	to	seven	per	cent	in	2013;	the	share	of	the	elite	(top	five	per	cent)
increased	from	13	per	cent	to	almost	20	per	cent,	and	the	share	of	the	top	decile	increased	from	about	21	to	31	per
cent.	Similarly,	inequality	calculated	across	all	adults,	and	measured	by	the	Gini	coefficient,	rose	from	0.27	in	1988
to	0.45	in	2013.	This	is	an	unsurprising	result	simply	confirming	what	other	studies	of	inequality	(cited	above)	have
also	found.
Figure	2.	Income	share	of	the	top	one,	five,	and	ten	per	cent
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Social	structure
A	new	question	we	ask	is	whether	the	social	composition	of	the	elite	has	changed	and	how.	The	surveys	distinguish
six	social	groups	or	classes:	workers,	clerical	and	office	employees,	government	administration	(at	all	levels),
professionals,	owners	of	individual	businesses	(including	the	self-employed)	and	larger-scale	owners.	There	was	a
major	shift	in	the	composition	of	the	elite	toward	the	two	latter	(capitalist)	classes	(Figure	1).	In	1988,	they
accounted	for	barely	three	per	cent	of	all	elite	members.	Then	their	share	doubled	to	about	six	per	cent	by	2002,
and	“exploded”	in	the	next	decade,	increasing	more	than	three-fold	to	reach	almost	20	per	cent	in	2013.	This	speed
of	social	change	in	China	may	be	contrasted	with	a	recent	finding	by	Bob	Allen	(2017),	who,	using	standardised
social	tables	for	England	and	Wales,	from	Gregory	King’s	1688	table	to	Dudley	Baxter’s	in	1867,	found	that	it	took
capitalists	almost	two	centuries	to	more	than	double	their	share	in	population,	passing	from	3.4	per	cent	in	1688	to
7.8	per	cent	in	1867.
The	Chinese	urban	elite,	which	before	the	important	urban	reforms	in	the	early	1990s	was	overwhelmingly
composed	of	workers,	clerical	staff	and	government	officials	—	the	three	classes	accounting	for	three	quarters	of
the	people	in	the	top	5	per	cent	in	1988	—	has	by	2013	become	an	elite	in	which	professionals	and	business
owners	are	in	the	majority.
Figure	3.	Social	composition	of	the	top	five	per	cent	(percentage	of	individuals)
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Chinese	Communist	Party	membership
The	Chinese	Communist	Party	(CCP)	has	been	growing	dramatically	since	it	was	founded	in	1921.	There	were	only
57	members	in	1921;	by	the	year	of	1988,	there	were	about	49	million,	accounting	for	five	per	cent	of	total
population	in	China;	in	2010,	the	number	of	CCP	members	reached	80	million,	accounting	for	13	per	cent	of	total
population	(see	Figure	4).
Figure	4.	Growth	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	since	1921
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An	interesting	question	in	a	de	facto	single-party	state	is	how	much	political	influence	or	connections	help	increase
income.		It	is	especially	intriguing	in	China,	where	the	ruling	party	is	officially	concerned	with	the	interests	of	the
poorer	or	less	educated	sections	of	the	population,	but	where	the	observed	changes	clearly	paint	a	picture	of	rising
importance	of	the	well-educated	professionals	and	entrepreneurs.
The	share	of	party	members	among	the	elite	(the	top	ten,	five	and	one	per	cent)	increased	continuously	between
1988	and	2002,	and	then	dropped	rather	precipitously	between	2002	and	2013.	By	2013,	the	share	was	lower	than
at	the	beginning	of	the	period.	Both	the	levels	and	the	evolution	of	the	share	are	very	similar	for	the	top	five	and	one
per	cent.	As	Figure	5	illustrates,	at	its	peaks,	CCP	membership	in	both	elite	groups	exceeded	one-half,	and	among
the	top	one	per	cent	it	reached	almost	60	per	cent.	But	by	2013,	CCP	members	were	only	one-third	of	the	top	five
per	cent	and	slightly	under	one-quarter	of	the	top	one	per	cent.
Figure	5.	The	share	of	communist	party	members	among	the	elite
However,	CCP	members	who	are	in	the	top	one	per	cent	are	nowadays	relatively	richer,	compared	to	the	average
income	of	the	rest	in	the	top	one	per	cent	(Figure	6).	In	all	the	years	prior	to	2013,	the	relative	income	of	CCP
members	was	about	the	same	as	the	relative	income	of	other	members	of	the	elite,	whether	we	look	at	the	group
that	comprises	percentiles	91-95,	percentiles	96-99,	or	the	top	one	per	cent		But	In	2013,	there	was	a	significant
increase	in	CCP	members’	relative	income	in	the	highest	income	group.
Figure	6.	Income	of	communist	party	members	of	the	elite	groups	compared	to	the	average	income	of	all	elite	members
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Note:	The	graph	shows	the	average	income	of	CCP	members	who	are	part	of	percentiles	91	to	95	(left),	percentiles	96	to	99	(middle)
and	the	top	percentile	(right)	relative	to	the	mean	income	of	that	group.	Value	of	1	indicates	that	average	income	of	CCP	members	is
the	same	as	the	average	income	of	the	group	(and	hence	also	to	the	average	income	of	non-Party	members).
In	general,	we	find	(not	shown	here)	that	while	professionals’	and	workers´	shares	in	urban	CCP	membership
approximate	closely	their	population	shares,	professionals	who	are	party	members	have	become	much	more
numerous	among	the	top	five	per	cent,	while	workers	have	become	much	rarer.	In	other	words,	whereas	the
structure	of	the	overall	communist	party	membership	in	the	recent	period	reflects	better	the	population	structure
than	in	1988,	the	party	top	is	moving	further	away	from	both	CCP	overall	class	composition	and	from	that	of	the
urban	population	as	a	whole.	This	might	have	important	political	consequences.
This	result	acquires	additional	significance	when	we	find	in	a	regression	analysis	that	private-sector	businessmen
who	are	part	of	the	elite	and	are	also	communist	party	members	tend	to	receive	a	very	large	premium	from	their
party	membership	(34	per	cent).	This	is	in	contrast	with	all	other	social	groups	to	whom	CCP	membership,	once
they	are	elite	members,	is	not	financially	important.	It	is	also	noteworthy	that	we	found	no	evidence	of	this	large
party	membership	premium	for	private-sector	businessmen	in	the	years	before	2013.
Conclusion
Chinese	economic,	and	as	we	argue	here,	social	transformation	during	the	past	four	decades	is	without	a	historical
precedent.	Urban	areas	have	become	much	richer,	but	also	much	more	unequal.	The	elite,	which	we	define	here	as
the	top	per	cent	of	the	urban	population,	receives	a	much	greater	share	of	total	urban	income	than	in	1988.	The
majority	of	the	elite	today	consists	of	professionals,	self-employed,	and	smaller	and	larger	businessmen	(while
workers	and	clerical	staff	were	in	the	majority	in	1988).
Finally,	we	find	that	almost	a	third	of	the	elite	are	members	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party,	and	that	membership
seems	to	be	quite	valuable	in	monetary	terms	to	those	in	the	top	one	per	cent	as	well	as	to	large	capitalists.	It
should	be	mentioned,	however,	that	CCP	membership	might	also	proxy	for	greater	ability	and	ambition	—	not
necessarily	only	for	better	political	connection	(Zhang	2007).	But	without	further	study	it	is	difficult	to	disentangle	the
two.
♣♣♣
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
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Economics.
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